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Abstract 
Guilt is one of the emotions that are considered a perfect example for social and moral. Recently, a few studies investigate the 
less positive effects it has for others than the victim of the transgression. The purpose of the present study is to investigate 
whether the results that De Hooge et al. (2011) found could be replicated in the Romanian culture. 134 participants were divided 
into three groups: a group where guilt was induced, a group where a victim of somebody else’s transgression was present and a 
control group. Our results replicate previous patterns in respect to guilt participants’ monetary divisions towards the victim but all 
the participants show a pattern of altruistic monetary division towards the others, which seems to indicate that guilt is indeed a 
moral emotion in this case. 
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1. Introduction 
Guilt is considered a prototype emotion for both social and moral emotions (Haidt, 2003; Tagney et al. 2007). 
One of the most innovative lines of research about guilt is conducted by de Hooge et al. (2011) and de Hooge 
(2012). These authors show that guilt may not be the unilateral emotion, the one that motivates social repair 
behaviours towards others, for fear of not letting the social relationship be damaged (Baumeister, 1994). Their 
results show that guilt motivates prosocial behaviour towards the victim at the expense of others in the social 
context, but not at a personal expense (De Hooge et al. 2011) and that repairing the damage may be more important 
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than repairing the endangered relationship (De Hooge, 2012). Since most of the research was conducted in dyadic 
decision situations (Ketelaar & Au, 2003; De Hooge et al. 2007; Nelissen et al. 2007), this new perspective is very 
important, since social contexts are seldom made up of only two people. These results question the role that the 
“hallmark of social emotions”, guilt, has been attributed (De Hooge, 2012). Moreover, these results reveal 
fascinating information and questions about an emotion that we thought we knew most of what there is to be known 
about.   
The purpose of the present study is to further investigate guilt’s motivation to repair the damage provoked by 
personal transgression and to see whether this compensatory behaviour is performed at personal expenses or having 
others to indirectly pay, by ignoring them. Therefore, we aim to replicate, in a group of Romanian students, the first 
experiment that de Hooge et al. (2011) conducted.  
We also want to study whether the prosocial behaviour is influenced by guilt or by the distress of having a victim 
of somebody else’s transgression in the vicinity (De Hooge et al. 2011). Their results indicate that feeling guilt 
motivates reparatory behaviours towards the victim, and this prosocial behaviour performed at the expense of others 
in the social context.      
2. Procedure 
2.1. Participants.
A number of 157 (144 women and 13 men; Mage=20,76, SD=3,103) students enrolled in the University Babeú
Bolyai participated in this study. They were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions of the study: a guilt 
condition, a victim condition and a control condition. 
2.2. Instruments. 
2.2.1. Moral scenarios. Three different moral scenarios were used. 
Participants were asked to imagine that they need a means of transportation and their friend offers them a bike 
that is very important to him. These scenarios were used by De Hooge et al. (2011) in the first experiment, and by 
De Hooge (2012). The guilt participants read that they forgot to lock the bike and it got stolen, they tell their friend 
about this and he is sad. The control group reads that everything went very well, they got what they needed from the 
shop and returned the bicycle to its owner. The victim group read a different ending: everything went well and the 
bike was returned to its owner but the next day another friend of the owner’s forgets to lock it and the bike gets 
stolen.  
2.2.2. Emotional State Scale (ESS).  
We asked the participants to indicate the how much guilt, shame, regret, disappointment, sadness, fear, anger, or 
dissatisfaction they felt, just as De Hooge et al. (2011) did. In addition to these emotions we added pride, joy, relief, 
remorse, feeling responsible, disgust towards the self, disgust towards own behaviour, dissatisfied with own 
conduct, angry about personal behaviour, dissatisfied with the self and asked the participants to rate these emotions 
or emotional states from 0 (not at all), to 5 (very strongly).. We have also considered using the guilt subscale from 
PANAS-X, which includes guilt and shame, and several other linguistic referents found to describe guilt. We have 
decided to use more emotional descriptors for guilt and shame in order to better differentiate between them, as some 
people use emotional labels interchangeably (Smith et al., 2001) and asking participants to finely distinguish 
between guilt and shame without any scaffolding is to be avoided. 
2.2.3. Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale  
Brief  Fear  of  Negative  Evaluation  Scale  (BFNE,  Carleton  et  al.,  2005,  2011)  evaluates  the  fear  of  being  
negatively evaluated by others, of not being accepted, and is also used for assessing social anxiety. We used a scale 
that contains 12 items, as this seems to be one of the best versions the scale has (Carleton et al., 2005). The scale we 
used  is  a  modified  variant  of  The  Fear  of  Negative  Evaluation  Scale  (FNE;  Watson & Friend,  1969)  and of  Brief  
Fear of Negative Evaluation scale (BFNE; Leary, 1983). The scale had good psychometric indicators (Carleton et 
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al., 2011). Leary (1983) modified it from a scale that had 30 items (Watson and Fiend, 1969) to a scale that had only 
12, and Carleton et al (2005) again modified it - transforming the inverse cotation items into affirmative ones. The 
initial scale used Yes/No answers, but the scale Leary (1983) and Carleton et al. (2005) use a Likert scale from 1 (“it 
does not describe me at all”) to 5 (“it describes me completely”). BFNE II was used with clinical populations as well 
as nonclinical population.  
2.2.4. Portrait Values Questionnaire 
Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ, Schwartz, 1994; 2001) is a 40-item questionnaire that assesses 
Schwartz’s (1992) 10 categories of moral values. Compared to the Schwartz Value Scale (Schwartz, 1992), the PVQ 
is easier to administer, less abstract, and suitable for adolescents also. We used a variant that made use of 
descriptions that did not refer to a female or a male participant so that we could administer the booklets randomly. 
Participants read several descriptions of other people’s values and rate how much or how little those people 
resembled them, from 1 (not like me at all) to 6 (very much like me). It has been used in numerous countries and it 
is a valid measure of values (Koivula  & Verkasalo, 2006;  Schwartz et al. 2001). 
2.2.3. Assessing Moral/Prosocial Behaviour.  
Participants read a short description stating that after a week from the initial incident they had to by two presents: 
one for the friend that helped them and one another friends, neutral to the previous stories. All the participants were 
asked to divide 100 lei between the victim (the individual that gives the bike), the other person (a neutral person), 
and themselves.  
3. Procedure.  
Participants completed these questionnaires during one of their classes. They were given a booklet containing the 
initial evaluation of the emotional state, the scenario (corresponding to each of the groups), then the manipulation-
check. Afterwards, participants read the scenario that assessed their prosocial behaviour, followed by the motivation 
for prosocial behaviour and again the ESS followed by the BFNE II and several other questionnaires, including the 
PVQ.
4. Results 
Some of the 157 participants were excluded due to their high initial scores for guilt or shame or regret therefore 
only the responses 134 (122 women and 12 men; Mage=20,88, SD=3,33) participants were included in the analysis.  
4.1.   Emotion-manipulation check  
We first compared the differences between the scores obtained in the initial evaluation and after reading the 
scenarios, and results only show differences for the group where guilt was induced t(54)=-27,09, p<.001), but not 
for the other two groups. Guilt participants reported more guilt after reading the scenario they were assigned 
compared with the other participants, both victim participants (t(99)=-17,431, p<.001) or control (t(86)=-23,049, 
p<.001). Guilt participants also reported more guilt than other emotions. There is a marginal significant effect in 
what concerns regret and guilt t(54)=1,922, p<.10).  
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4.2. Money division 
The participants that were included in the guilt condition decided to give more money to the victim than the 
victim participants (t(99)=4,722, p<.01), or than the control group (t(99)=4,945, p<.01). This is the same result as 
Hooge et al.’s (2011). Next, the guilt participants kept for themselves the least amount of money compared to the 
victim group (t(99)=-3,492, p<.01) and also compared with the control group (t(99)=-3,794, p<.01).In concern with 
the sum offered to the other friend, the sums that the participants from the guilt group were not different from those 
offered by the victim or control groups. As it  can be seen in Table 1, all  the participants gave more money to the 
victim/the one that helped, to the other friend and kept the least amount for themselves.  
Table 1.  Prosocial behaviour as a function of Emotion Condition  
Guilt (N=55) Control (N=46) Victim (N=33) 
Victim 60,61 (15,377)       > 44,24 (14,422)          = 45,24 (17,319) 
Nonvictim 28,27 (10,245)       = 31,82 (10,370)          = 32,20 (10,862) 
Self 11,13 (12,356)      < 23,94 (19,355)          = 21,48 (17,348) 
Data indicate mean (and standard deviation) of 100 Ron among three persons.The higher the scores, the more 
prosocial the behaviour is considered. There were no signifficant differences between means in the columns are 
separated by an = sign, and means separated by > or by < show a significant differences.  
Since these results are so different from what we have expected and from those obtained by De Hooge et al. 
(2011) we tried to associate these scores with the scores from the BFNE which measures the fear of negative 
evaluation and with the scale of conformity from the PVQ, thinking that these results are maybe a product of social 
desirability. There are no associations between the BFNE scale and the conformity scales, which might suggest, in 
our opinion, the possibility that the scores were not influenced by social desirability.   
5. Discussion 
It seems that guilt is a moral emotion, if moral emotions are those that motivate prosocial and altruistic 
tendencies. The guilt participants showed the same pattern as the participants in De Hooge et al. (2011) study, 
giving more money to the victim than did the victim condition or control participants. The interesting result is that 
guilty participants kept the least amount for themselves, which might be interpreted as altruism.  
With regard to the sum attributed to the other friend’s present, guilt participants did not differ from the other two 
groups – and this is a different result than De Hooge et al. (2011) have previously shown. Also, there were no 
differences between the monetary divisions of the victim or the control participants, which is the same result as the 
one obtained by De Hooge et al. (2011). The great difference is that all the participants gave more to the victim/the 
individual that helped them, then for the neutral friend’s present, and the least amount of money was attributed for 
them. We find this very intriguing and thought of social desirability, but this seems not to be the case here.  
Therefore, the possible explanation for their attributing more money to others (either their own victim or the 
person that helped them-this is the case for control participants, or the victim of others) than themselves is either a 
personal preference for monetary divisions (Murphy et al., in press), or/and a cultural difference of social orientation 
value towards helping and care, which will be very interesting to study.  
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A limitation of the study was the unequal number of female and male participants, and this did not allow us to 
compute gender differences. In our further extensions of this line of research we will not be using so many 
descriptors as we did, because it is redundant and it seems that it does not serve the purpose of the study.  
This study brings an improved method of assessing the manipulation check of guilt, by adding an initial 
evaluation of participants’ emotional state. We aimed to replicate a previous break-through study published by De 
Hooge, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg (2011), that investigates the “selfish side of guilt”, which is probably 
present in reality, as perfect, unilateral emotions can be distinguished only in a laboratory study. Our results showed 
that the Romanian students included in this study have decided to act altruistically towards a victim or a helping 
person, at their disadvantage. We consider this result one that might indicate a cultural difference that should be 
further investigated.    
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